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It is now six years since the 2002 ‘crisis in insurance’. It can now be 
observed that the attributed cause of the crisis - an explosion in common 
law personal injuries claims - was overstated. It is also evident that the 
legislature’s solution to the crisis was excessive. Statutory amendments took 
away from injured plaintiffs the right to sue - to the benefit of negligent 
tortfeasors and their indemnifiers. They assisted private corporations’ 
return to profitability by depriving the injured of the right to compensation. 
Accordingly, it is now time to consider other alternatives: if not a return to 
an unfettered common law (the limitations of which have often been 
discussed), then perhaps other alternatives, including broad-based no fault 
compensation such as that in use in New Zealand. 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
The development of law should be a victory of reason over expediency. 
However, sometimes the upholding of an ideal can be problematic and 
sometimes it appears that expediency is victorious. This could be a good 
description of the law of negligence, how it relates to personal injuries, and 
the legislative intrusions into that law which occurred in the wake of the 
‘crisis in insurance’ of 2002, leaving many injured persons deprived of a 
claim. 
 
Until that time the development of the most precocious tort of the last 
hundred years provided a good illustration of the value of the common law. 
As Australia’s Chief Justice, Murray Gleeson, said recently: 
 
Australia, like all other common law jurisdictions, has experienced the 
relentless progress of the tort of negligence. Lord Atkin's formulation, in 
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Donoghue v Stevenson
1, of an over-arching principle to decide when a 
defendant will be made liable for damage caused to another through failure 
to take reasonable care was a triumph of common law jurisprudence.2 
 
His Honour went on to note that despite this ‘triumph’, even back in 1932 
difficulties in applying the ‘duty of care’ principle were apparent.3 Yet in 
applying the duty to all manner of persons from owners of property, 
landlords, employers, large corporations and public authorities to service 
providers and various other professionals, the courts navigated these 
difficulties with a degree of success. In a modest way, they were assisted by 
the legislature. For example, the partial defence of contributory negligence as 
it has been understood for the last fifty years is wholly the creation of 
statute.4 Nevertheless, despite such assistance, it is fair to say that until 
recently the development of negligence was mostly the product of judicial 
decisions.  
 
The perceived ‘crisis in insurance’ of 2002 was a brutal interruption to this 
parade. Governments all around Australia perceived a difficulty that they 
considered was beyond the judges (arguably, they viewed the judges as the 
cause5) and they swiftly intervened. The experience in Victoria was reflective 
                                                 
1 [1932] AC 562. 
2 Chief Justice Murray Gleeson, ‘Australia’s Contribution to the Common Law’ (Speech 
delivered at the Singapore Academy of Law, Singapore, 20 September 2007) 
<http://www.hcourt.gov.au/speeches/cj/cj_20sep07.pdf> at 29 October 2007. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Under the common law, contributory negligence was a complete defence no matter how 
slight the contribution of the plaintiff. See, for example, Butterfield v Forrester (1809) 103 ER 
1134.  This position was altered with the passage of the Law Reform (Contributory 
Negligence) Act 1945 (UK), the provisions of which allowed a plaintiff’s action to stand but 
subject to a reduction in damages based on the plaintiff’s share in the responsibility for the 
damage. This Act provided the model for similar provisions in other jurisdictions including the 
precursors to section 26 of the Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic). Interestingly, this change in the 
imperial statute coincides with Ipp J’s opinion that in 1945 the development of the law shifted 
from a position of favouring defendants to favouring plaintiffs. 
5 The description by Federal Assistant Treasurer Senator Helen Coonan of some judges who 
sought to limit the effects of the common law as ‘enlightened judges’ certainly indicates that 
she considered that there were other less ‘enlightened’ judges who were assisting in expanding 
the applications of the law of negligence in allocating liability to defendants, leading to claims 
on their insurers: Helen Coonan, ‘Liability Reform: It’s Not a Waiting Game’ (Speech 
delivered at the Australian Insurance Law Association, Melbourne, 18 October 2002) 
<http://www.treasurer.gov.au/atr/content/speeches/2002/021.asp> at 6 November 2007. Justice 
David Ipp of the New South Wales Supreme Court (who headed the 2002 Review into the Law 
of Negligence) in a speech to the medical profession also noted that he had heard of judges 
being blamed for the crisis: Justice David Ipp, ‘Judges and Judging’ (President’s Lecture 
delivered at the Annual Scientific Congress of Royal Australasian College of Surgeons, 
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of the rest of Australia. Amendments to the Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) and other 
legislation limited the damages that plaintiffs could claim for personal 
injuries caused by another’s negligence. In some cases, the changes abolished 
the claims altogether.  
 
Were these ‘reforms’ necessary? 
 
The passing of six years presents a timely opportunity to query whether the 
changes were really necessary. The added perspective of time allows for the 
results flowing from the remedies to the ‘crisis’ to be reviewed.  Using the 
experience in Victoria as a guide, this article aims to consider three issues: 
first, whether there was actually a ‘crisis in insurance’, the blame for which 
could be placed at the door of an over-reliance on the law of negligence; 
second, whether the crisis justified taking away the right of injured persons to 
sue, to the benefit of negligent wrongdoers and their indemnifiers; and third, 
whether there is a better way of compensating injured people. 
 
The third issue is based on the premise that there are obviously concerns 
regarding the way the tort of negligence has operated, but there are also 
concerns with the legislative solutions of six years ago. It poses the question 
of whether there is a better way of compensating for injuries. This question 
has been posed before. In the 1970s, Australia toyed with the idea of adopting 
a broad-based no fault compensation scheme similar to that which was 
introduced in New Zealand in 1974 and continues to this day. At the time, 
Australia rejected such a scheme in favour of the continued operation of the 
common law. The arguments in favour of a largely unfettered law of 
negligence evidently held sway. However, in the ensuing thirty years the law 
has changed. Even before the ‘crisis in insurance’, no fault compensation 
schemes for most transport accidents and workplace injuries were introduced 
in many states, creating what is effectively a hybrid system of no fault 
compensation and common law compensation. The further emasculation of 
the law of negligence in the wake of the ‘crisis in insurance’ has certainly 
made that area of tort law a pale shadow of its former self.  
 
Accordingly, in the changed conditions of the first decade of the twenty-first 
century, it should now be asked again whether Victoria and other Australian 
jurisdictions are ready for broad-based no fault injury compensation. 
 
                                                                                                                    
Brisbane, 8 May 2003) <http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/supreme_court/ll_sc.nsf/ 
pages/SCO_speech_ipp_080503> at 6 November 2007.  
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In summary, this article argues that the blame for the ‘crisis in insurance’ was 
incorrectly attributed to an excess of plaintiffs exercising their rights under 
the existing law, whether their claims were based on negligence or any other 
cause of action, and that the laws passed on this basis to address the crisis 
were therefore not justified.  It is further argued that these laws abrogating 
the rights of injured plaintiffs to the advantage of defendants and their 
underwriters were not only excessive but unjust, and that in light of the 
compromises now inherent in the law of negligence, which makes it 
restrictive and complicated, the time is ripe to consider a complete alternative 
which redresses this imbalance. 
 
II THE CRISIS IN INSURANCE AND ITS CAUSES 
 
Undoubtedly, the insurance industry in the years immediately preceding 2002 
was experiencing difficulties. Statistics produced by the Australian Prudential 
Regulation Authority (‘APRA’),6 and adopted by the Insurance Council of 
Australia,7 bear out the fact that the industry was incurring losses worth 
billions of dollars per year, and had been for a few years. There was a crisis 
that appeared to threaten the viability of the insurance industry. Indeed, it 
could be broadly suggested that the collapse in 2001 of HIH with losses 
worth billions of dollars was a clear illustration to the industry – and those 
who depended on insurance – of where the crisis was heading.8 However, the 
response of government was perplexing. With the benefit of hindsight the 
identification of causes of the crisis appears more arbitrary than systematic, 
and driven more by a sense of panic than reason. These traits probably 
affected the formulation of effective strategies to deal with the crisis. 
 
A Identifying Causes – the Law of Negligence  
Assertions 
 
In 2002, not unnaturally, and after consulting with state governments, the 
Commonwealth Government’s substantial response to the crisis (prior to 
                                                 
6 APRA noted, for the insurance industry, underwriting losses of $2.62 billion at June 2000; 
$1.2 billion at June 2001; and $630 million at June 2002: Australian Prudential Regulation 
Authority, Statistics: Half Yearly General Insurance Bulletin, June 2006 (2007) 
<http://www.apra.gov.au/Statistics/GI-Half-Yearly-Statistics.cfm> at 30 October 2007. 
7 Insurance Council of Australia, Year in Review - 2006 (2007) 
<http://www.insurancecouncil.com.au/Year-in-review-2006-/default.aspx> at 25 October 
2007.   
8 The deficiency in HIH’s accounts was estimated at somewhere between $3.6 billion and 
$5.3 billion by the Royal Commission established to investigate the collapse of this insurer. 
See Commonwealth of Australia, HIH Royal Commission, The Failure of HIH Insurance 
(2003), vol 1, viii. 
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passing legislation) was to appoint a committee of inquiry. Described as a 
‘panel of four persons’, it was headed by Justice David Ipp of the New South 
Wales Court of Appeal. However, whereas it might be expected that such a 
committee would be directed to investigate the causes of the crisis before 
formulating a response, this committee’s terms of reference made it clear that 
the cause had already been identified. The terms stated: 
 
The award of damages for personal injury has become unaffordable and 
unsustainable as the principal source of compensation for those injured 
through the fault of another. It is desirable to examine a method for the 
reform of the common law with the objective of limiting liability and 
quantum of damages arising from personal injury and death. 9 
 
The Panel was not to examine this proposition, and said this early in its final 
report (the ‘Ipp Report’).10 Rather, it was directed to ‘[d]evelop and evaluate 
principled options to limit liability and quantum of awards for damages.’11  
That even the committee charged with identifying changes to the law should 
not be required to first identify the causes of the difficulties necessitating 
such changes is perplexing. The Panel had only two months to deliver its 
initial report is also reflective of the prevailing attitudes at the time.12 
Everything was being done in a hurry. 
 
Looked at with the benefit of hindsight, the climate of public debate 
surrounding the crisis presents three clear characteristics: 
 
First, the debate appears dramatic and beset by panic. Certainly, the reports in 
the media suggested a degree of panic. Following on from the international 
reports of the terrorists attacks of 11 September 2001 (the results of which 
constituted the single largest insurance claim in history)13 and the collapse of 
HIH, barely a day in 2002 passed without a report of a business or social 
gathering being threatened with closure either because it could not obtain 
                                                 
9 Negligence Review Panel, Commonwealth, Review of the Law of Negligence – Final Report 
(2002) vii <http://revofneg.treasury.gov.au/content/reports.asp> at 30 October 2007. 
10 In fact, in the Panel’s final report, it is stated that ‘[t]he Panel's task is not to test the 
accuracy of these perceptions but to take as a starting point for conducting its inquiry the 
general belief in the Australian community that there is an urgent need to address these 
problems’: Ibid [1.6]. 
11 Ibid vii. 
12 The terms of reference were dated 2 July 2002, with portions of the report due by 30 August 
2002, and the remainder due on 30 September 2002: Ibid ix. 
13 Philip McGuire, Deputy CEO of Insurance Council of Australia, speaking on ABC 
Television, ‘Ministers meet to address public liability crisis’, Landline, 7 April 2002  
<http://www.abc.net.au/landline/stories/s518565.htm> at 30 October 2007. 
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insurance or could not afford to pay rapidly rising insurance premiums. There 
were reports of builders’ insurance increasing by up to 150 per cent.14 Public 
liability insurance had also increased. At one stage it was suggested that in 
future years the Royal Melbourne Show might not go ahead on account of its 
premiums having tripled in the previous four years.15 Providers of all manner 
of recreational activities were also under threat, whether they were operators 
of basketball courts16 or camel trek rides.17 Members of the medical 
profession reportedly were also considering their options after the provider of 
medical indemnity, UMP, was placed into liquidation.18 One report even told 
of how the entire town of Mansfield had ceased business for a day on account 
of insurance concerns.19 To view the reports from the distance of six years is 
to witness the building of a frenzy - not the ideal environment in which to 
formulate policy. 
 
Second, most media commentators and lawmakers immediately fastened on 
the operation of the law as the cause of the crisis, and particularly the law 
relating to compensation for personal injuries. This is well reflected by the 
views of Senator Helen Coonan who was the minister responsible for the 
terms of reference for the Ipp Report. Later in 2002, Senator Coonan stated: 
 
There is a widely held view that the current problems in the insurance 
market are due in large part to the operation of the legal system. It is clear 
that the broader community is dissatisfied with the seemingly random nature 
of court awards. There is also a strong perception that an increasing culture 
of blame has emerged within our society. This has led individuals to seek 
redress through the legal system, where in similar circumstances in the past, 
the individual would have been more prepared to assume responsibility for 
the consequences of their own actions.20 
 
Third, despite the causes of the crisis being regularly attributed to the 
operation of the law and litigation and the rise of the ‘blame’ society, there 
was little empirical or statistical evidence presented to support such 
                                                 
14 Linda Morris, ‘Building Insurance UP 150%’, Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 6 February 
2002, 3. 
15 McGuire, above n 13. 
16 ‘Insurance Crisis May Crush Sport Teams’, The Age (Melbourne), 6 August 2002. 
17 Kathleen Cuthbertson, ‘Insurance Anger Stops Mansfield’, Herald Sun (Melbourne), 15 
March 2002, 24. 
18ABC Television, ‘Doctors’ Insurance Crisis’, Lateline, 29 April 2002 
<http://www.abc.net.au/lateline/stories/s543171.htm> at 30 October 2007. 
19 Cuthbertson, above n 17. 
20 Helen Coonan, ‘Insurance Premiums and Law Reform – Affordable Cover and the Role of 
Government’ (2002) 25 University of New South Wales Law Journal 819, 819. 
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attribution. Although there was frequent use of anecdotal evidence of large 
awards of compensation being made,21 and it was asserted that the numbers 
of such awards were increasing,22 a regular complaint of commentators was 
that facts and figures were wanting.23 Indeed, although insurers sought 
restrictions in plaintiffs’ rights to sue on account of the effects that these 
growing numbers of lawsuits had had on their businesses, it was pointed out 
that the insurers were ‘reluctant to reveal their claims experience’, and 
provide the evidence of such an increase.24  
 
 B Identifying Causes – Litigation Statistics 
 
Planning a legal reform which will take away plaintiffs’ substantive rights on 
the basis of inadequate information can lead to ineffective reform, 
particularly if adequate information might have led to different conclusions. 
And yet, adequate information was available. Although they did not receive 
as much coverage as the stories of anecdote and assertion, there were 
contemporaneous attempts made to present a statistical picture of litigation 
trends. For example, Rob Davis of the Australian Plaintiff Lawyers 
Association cited data of the Australian Productivity Commission to show 
that there was actually evidence of a decline in personal injuries litigation 
towards the end of the 1990s.25 He also explained that, although in some 
individual jurisdictions there might have been cases of increased personal 
                                                 
21 See, for example, the report of a payout of $5.7 million to a wrestler left a quadriplegic after 
a training accident: Shaun Phillips and Karen Collier, ‘Sports Insurance Premiums May 
Double’, Herald Sun (Melbourne), 8 May 2002, 6. Interestingly, in reflecting the view that this 
perception of large payouts is based on limited, unusual and ‘newsworthy’ cases, Queensland 
Chief Justice Paul de Jersey, when recently describing the 2002 experience, felt the need to 
draw on the recent case in the United States of a junior judge launching a $64 million lawsuit 
over damage caused to his trousers by a drycleaner. Although the Chief Justice’s point was 
that such accounts did not help the reputation of the legal system, he also had to concede that 
this lawsuit did not accord with the ‘local reality’:  Chief Justice Paul de Jersey, ‘A Review of 
the Civil Liability Act and Tort Reform in Queensland: Opening Plenary Forum Discussion’ 
(Speech delivered at the Queensland Law Society Personal Injuries Conference, Brisbane, 29 
June 2007) < http://archive.sclqld.org.au/judgepub/2007/dejersey290607.pdf > at 7 November 
2007. 
22 And yet, in at least one empirical study, although it has been noted that awards of damages 
have increased between 1980 and 2000, it has also been pointed out that high awards of 
compensation are exceptional, and that generally awards are not excessive: Peter Abelson, ‘Is 
Injury Compensation Excessive?’ (2004) 23 Economic Papers 129. 
23 See, eg, Reg Graycar, ‘Public Liability: A Plea for Facts’ (2002) 25 University of New South 
Wales Law Journal 810. 
24 Harold Luntz, ‘Reform of the Law of Negligence: Wrong Questions – Wrong Answers’ 
(2002) 25 University of New South Wales Law Journal 836, 837. 
25 Rob Davis, ‘The Tort Reform Crisis’ (2002) 25 University of New South Wales Law Journal 
865, 866. 
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injury litigation, these were more than balanced by a decline in other 
jurisdictions.26 
 
More recently, the 2006 study by Professor E W Wright of the University of 
Newcastle provided evidence of a clear trend reflecting a decline in litigation 
prior to 2002.27 His study tallied the personal injury claims from the 
Supreme, County and District Courts around Australia. Rather than merely 
compiling raw total numbers of claims – which in a rising national population 
would be expected to rise – his figures were presented in terms of the number 
of claims per 10,000 members of the population. On this basis, Wright’s 
figures indicated that, although there had been a slight increase in claims in 
the late 1990s - from 4 to 5 - this had dropped off again by 2000, only then 
spiking in 2002 in anticipation of the post-Ipp reforms.28 In other words, if 
there was a ‘crisis in insurance’, it was not caused by any radical increase in 
litigants using the law to seek compensation from defendants and their 
insurers for their personal injuries. Accordingly, the expression ‘tort law 
crisis’, which is sometimes also deployed to describe the situation,29 is 
inaccurate, except in so far as it described the oncoming curtailment of legal 
rights to compensation. 
 
 C Identifying Causes – Other Causes 
 
If a rampant culture of litigation and attribution of blame was not the cause of 
the crisis, what other causes might be suggested? Interestingly, in an apparent 
demonstration of putting the cart before the horse, some months after the 
delivery of the Ipp Report the Economics References Committee of the 
Australian Senate presented its report into public liability and professional 
indemnity.30 This committee identified three causes of the crisis: 
 
                                                 
26 Ibid 867. 
27 E W Wright, ‘National Trends in Personal Injury Litigation: Before and After “Ipp”’ (2006) 
14 Torts Law Journal 233. 
28 Ibid 248. 
29 See, for example, Paul Latimer, Australian Business Law (26th ed, 2007) 217. 
30 Economics References Committee, Parliament of Australia (Senate), A Review of Public 
Liability and Professional Indemnity Insurance (2002). 
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 international influences including the withdrawal of capacity and the 
increasing cost of reinsurance following the destruction of New York’s 
World Trade Centre in terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001;  
 the ‘hardening’ of the insurance market as, after a period of underpricing 
and poor profitability in the mid 1990s, insurers now focus on improving 
profitability rather than merely increasing market share; and  
 the increasing cost of claims.31 
 
The last of these three has already been noted.32 However, what of the other 
two? Where did they feature in the terms of reference of Justice Ipp’s Review 
of the Law of Negligence?  
 
In fact, they appear elsewhere as suggested reasons for a downturn in the 
fortunes of the insurance industry. In addition to being pointed to by the 
Economics References Committee, they were also discussed by one other 
significant government inquiry into a major player in the insurance industry: 
the Royal Commission into the collapse of HIH.33 And yet, when the Royal 
Commission into the collapse of HIH investigated the reason for that 
collapse, it focused on a further cause of the collapse of that particular 
insurer. The collapse of HIH could be viewed both as being emblematic of 
the crisis in insurance, and also as suggesting a further cause of the 
difficulties besetting the insurance industry.  
 
HIH was a large insurer – indeed one of the ‘major players’ in Australia34 – 
and it collapsed. The obvious observation is that if such a large market leader 
could go under, then things must be difficult in insurance. And yet, the 
Commissioner Neville Owen found the causes of the collapse to be specific 
to HIH. Although he noted the global downturn in the insurance industry, he 
also observed that the market was cyclical and that other insurers ‘weathered 
the storm’.35 He also noted that, although HIH had experienced losses in its 
underwriting business, this is not fatal if other aspects of the business such as 
investment of policy holders’ funds return a profit.36 However, what 
ultimately condemned HIH in Commissioner Owen’s opinion was that this 
company was mismanaged and dominated by a flawed corporate culture. He 
said: 
 
                                                 
31 Ibid [2.1]. 
32 See text under Heading 2(a) above. 
33 See generally Commonwealth of Australia, HIH Royal Commission, The Failure of HIH 
Insurance (2003).  
34 Economics References Committee, above n 30, [2.14]. 
35 HIH Royal Commission, above n 32, xvi. 
36 Ibid xviii. 
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The answer here is that HIH was mismanaged. The factors contributing to 
the mismanagement of the group—and hence the reasons for the failure—
are many, varied and complex. They are also interrelated. They are 
epitomised by a lack of attention to detail, a lack of accountability for 
performance, and a lack of integrity in the company’s internal processes and 
systems. Combined, these features led to a series of business decisions that 
were poorly conceived and even more poorly executed.37 
 
Of the firm’s culture, the Commissioner stated: 
 
There was blind faith in a leadership that was ill-equipped for the task. 
There was insufficient ability and independence of mind in and associated 
with the organisation to see what had to be done and what had to be stopped 
or avoided. Risks were not properly identified and managed. Unpleasant 
information was hidden, filtered or sanitised. And there was a lack of 
sceptical questioning and analysis when and where it mattered.38 
 
As for any clear fraud or dishonesty, although it existed, the Commissioner 
explained that ‘[m]ost of the instances of possible malfeasance were borne of 
a misconceived desire to paper over the ever-widening cracks that were 
appearing in the edifice that was HIH.’39 In other words, the collapse of HIH 
was not caused by either an increasingly litigious community, or a 
devastating downturn in the insurance market. Its troubles were the result of 
internal failures and a fatally flawed and ineffective record of corporate 
governance.40 
 
In summary, in considering the causes of the crisis in insurance, in addition 
to the causes identified by the Economics References Committee, might it not 
also be the case that other insurers were subject to the same difficulties which 
beset HIH, albeit to a lesser extent?41 
                                                 
37 Ibid xvii. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid xvi. 
40 These aspects of the Commissioner’s report are emphasised in Phillip Lipton, ‘The Demise 
of HIH: Corporate Governance Lessons’ (2003) 55(5) Keeping Good Companies 273. See also 
Gregor Allen, ‘The HIH Collapse: A Costly Catalyst for Reform’ (2006) 11 Deakin Law 
Review 137, in which it is queried whether legislative changes to auditing standards will be 
either effective or workable. In fact, the sub-text to such a study is that, despite the flawed 
auditing in detecting the mismanagement at HIH, it was nevertheless still the directors and 
officers of that company who were responsible for its collapse and not an inadequacy in the 
law.  
41 In making this statement, it is an underlying assumption that the corporate model of many 
large insurance companies has many inefficiencies which arguably have made the provision of 
insurance to the consumer more costly than was once the case. Specifically, for example, the 
global wave of demutualisations in the insurance sector since the 1980s has now diverted the 
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II EFFECTS OF THE CRISIS IN INSURANCE 
 
 A Legislative Changes 
 
Adding to the perplexing approach taken to deal with the crisis in insurance 
already outlined, the legislative innovations introduced by the various 
Australian jurisdictions had a further puzzling dimension. In an apolitical 
approach, both Liberal and Labor politicians at both levels of government 
supported the push for legislative change. However, although the States had 
supported the Commonwealth in commissioning the Ipp Report, and the Ipp 
Report had recommended that any legislative changes be uniformly enacted 
around the country,42 uniformity was soon abandoned. Even before the final 
report was released those same States jumped the gun. Although they were 
criticised for it, they nevertheless commenced passing their own legislation to 
change the law of negligence.43   
 
In Victoria, the Wrongs Act 1958 was heavily amended through three 
different pieces of legislation passed in 2002,44 and 2003.45  Many of the 
changes codified certain concepts relating to the law of negligence.46 Some 
                                                                                                                    
focus of the insurers’ energies away from the primary goal of providing for the insurers’ 
former members. The trend has been as apparent in Australia as overseas: See Reserve Bank of 
Australia, ‘Demutualisation in Australia’ (1999) Reserve Bank of Australia Bulletin, 
<http://www.rba.gov.au/ PublicationsAndResearch/Bulletin/bu_jan99/bu_0199_1.pdf> at 27 
November 2007. Once demutualised, the satisfaction of shareholders and their need for 
dividends and capital growth must supplant the previous primary goal of fund members’ 
interests. In addition, the salary aspirations of directors and officers of these demutualised 
insurers also have the effect of increasing costs. To illustrate this point, in the United 
Kingdom, although a recent inquiry found as a general trend that demutualised insurers 
performed no better after demutualisation, salaries of their directors had grown appreciably. 
Further, across a range of indicators in relation to life assurance, continuing mutual insurers 
performed more successfully than former mutuals, and passed on the financial benefits 
accruing from these successes to their members: See All Parliamentary Group for Building 
Societies and Financial Mutuals  (United Kingdom), Windfalls or Shortfalls? The True Cost of 
Demutualisation (2006)  <http://www.mutuo.co.uk/pdf/windfallsorshortfallsfinal.pdf> at 27 
November 2007.  
42 Negligence Review Panel, above n 9, [2.1]. 
43 Andrew White and Amanda Keenan, ‘Insurance Reform in Chaos - NSW and Victoria Go 
Their Own Way in Face of Federal Blueprint’, The Australian (Sydney), 3 September 2002, 1. 
Interestingly, some newspapers presented a more positive headline to the reports, but 
nevertheless also explained that there were differences in approach across the various 
jurisdictions: See, for example, Linda Morris, ‘Leaders Unite for National Approach to 
Liability Laws’, Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 3 October 2002, 6.  
44 Wrongs and Other Acts (Public Liability Insurance Reform) Act 2002 (Vic). 
45 Wrongs and Limitation of Actions Acts (Insurance Reform) Act 2003 (Vic); Wrongs and 
Other Acts (Law of Negligence) Act 2003 (Vic). 
46 See Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) pt X, introduced in 2003. 
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set down principles regarding proportionate liability and contribution.47 
Others, however, went further. A new Part VB introduced a number of caps 
on damages, including: first, a cap on damages for loss of earnings equal to 
three times the average weekly earnings of a Victorian employee as 
determined by the Australian Statistician;48 and, second, an indexed cap on 
non-economic loss (or ‘general’) damages of $371,380.49 Arguably, the effect 
of these changes was confined to limited classes of plaintiffs. The first cap, 
for example, only limited damages to those plaintiffs who might be described 
as high-income earners. Similarly, the effect of the cap on non-economic loss 
damages was arguably small. This is because only a small number of cases 
will create the circumstances for an award of such damages accounting for 
pain and suffering, loss of amenity and enjoyment of life greater than this 
sum. Nevertheless, in cases where damages are assessed that are in excess of 
both of these the capped amounts, there is arguably an injustice when the 
payment of the damages cannot be made because of these caps. Injured 
plaintiffs must bear this loss themselves, rather than the negligent defendants 
doing so.50  
 
Further, although its effect is also limited, an injustice can also be identified 
in section 28C(3) which states that the Part VB caps extend to personal injury 
damages ‘even if the damages are recovered in any action for breach of 
contract or in any other action.’51 What of the situation where the damage 
was caused by way of an intentional tort and not mere negligence? Unlike 
similar post-Ipp legislation in New South Wales and South Australia which 
specifically excluded extending the caps to intentional torts,52 in Victoria the 
                                                 
47 See Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) pts IV, IVAA. 
48 Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 28F. 
49 Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 28G. 
50 The same argument can be made for other damages assessments which are now capped, 
including, for example, the cap on damages for ‘gratuitous attendant care’ under section 28IB, 
and also damages for loss of capacity to provide care for others under section 28IE. For a 
recent example of what sort of damages are covered under this latter heading, see CSR Limited 
v Eddy [2005] HCA 64, in which compensation was claimed for a plaintiff’s inability to 
provide domestic assistance to his blind wife and the court made brief comments on the 
Victorian legislation.     
51 Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 28C(3). 
52 In New South Wales, section 3B(1)(a) of the Civil Liability Act 2002 specifically excludes 
from the operation of the reforms ‘civil liability in respect of an intentional act that is done 
with intent to cause injury or death’. Similarly, in South Australia, section 51(a)(ii) of the Civil 
Liability Act 1936 (SA) applies the reforms only to ‘accidents caused wholly or in part by 
negligence or some other unintentional tort. 
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intentional tortfeasor is protected from the full weight of the common law 
through the broad reach of the caps.53 
 
More striking because of its broad application to a large number of injured 
persons was the introduction, in the new Part VBA of the Wrongs Act 1958 
(Vic), of a threshold for claims for non-economic loss.54 When introducing 
the amendment, the Victorian Premier, Mr Bracks, explained that for small 
claims – meaning claims of $50,000 or less – half of the damages paid are 
general damages.55 Therefore, citing businesses and professionals who were 
‘concerned about the cost of meeting a succession of minor claims’,56 the 
State Government, rather than requiring these businesses to observe their 
duty of care, instead abolished plaintiffs’ rights to these ‘minor claims’. This 
was done by requiring that the person injured must establish that they had 
suffered a ‘significant injury’.57 ‘Significant injury’ was defined as meaning 
an injury assessed as being either above the ‘threshold level’ of more than 5 
per cent bodily impairment (or 10 per cent impairment for a psychiatric 
injury), or the loss of a breast or foetus.58 Anything less would not be 
compensated.59  A staggering amendment, but one of broad application,60 it 
effectively set the untreated pain and suffering of individuals who failed to 
establish significant injury, and the consequent effects of that pain, at naught, 
wholly to the benefit of the tortfeasors.61  
                                                 
53 Although it has not been tested, there is perhaps one way that plaintiffs in Victoria can 
circumvent this broad rule. Specifically, although in section 21 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 
New South Wales adopted the Ipp Report recommendation to abolish exemplary damages, the 
Victorian legislation in contrast was generally silent on this point. Thus, although such 
damages are very rarely awarded in Australian jurisdictions, they could theoretically find a 
place in the arguments of those injured through intentional wrongs and provide scope for 
compensation beyond the limits set down in the Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic). 
54 Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 28LE. 
55 Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 21 May 2003, 1782 (Steve Bracks, 
Premier). 
56 Ibid. 
57 Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 28LE. 
58 Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) ss 28LB, LF. 
59 Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 28LE. 
60 A similar threshold for pain and suffering compensation was also applied to the Victorian no 
fault compensation scheme for workplace injuries: Accident Compensation Act 1985 (Vic) s 
98C. In contrast, under the no fault scheme in relation to transport injuries, the right to claim 
for pain and suffering only arises if a ‘serious injury’ is identified and common law 
proceedings allow it: Transport Accident Act 1986 (Vic) s 93. The no fault schemes are 
discussed in the text below. 
61 In addition, although there is little judicial discussion on this point, considering the history 
of the related threshold of ‘serious injury’ which is used in relation to transport accidents and 
workplace accidents to allow common law claims, it would be very surprising if the expression 
‘significant injury’, despite the exhaustive definition, is given anything other than a restrictive 
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Other very significant legislative changes also appeared. For example, it was 
recognised that many personal injuries claims are for breach of contract, 
based on injuries caused when plaintiffs are engaged in recreational activities. 
Therefore, just as the Commonwealth amended the Trade Practices Act 1974 
in 2002,62 the Victorian Government followed suit and amended its 
equivalent statute, the Fair Trading Act 1999.63 The amendments of both 
Acts now allow providers of recreational services (i.e. providers of sporting 
or leisure activities undertaken for enjoyment which involve a degree of 
physical exertion or risk) to contractually exclude their liability for injury or 
death even if this damage is caused by a lack of due care and skill on their 
part. Even six years later, the implications of these amendments are 
staggering. For example, the purchaser of a tourist flight or bungee jump, not 
being an expert, relies on the skills of their provider. However, since 2003, 
that provider will not be liable if an appropriate disclaimer has been signed. 
The user, perhaps suffering all manner of injuries, is now thrown onto their 
own resources. For this reason, the criticism has been made that although the 
legislature was seeking to wind back excessive personal injuries claims and 
‘achieve a balance between protecting consumers and allowing them to take 
responsibility for themselves’, by allowing providers to contract out of all of 
their liability the new sections have gone too far.64 
 
Finally, other amendments were designed to close off alternative causes of 
action which might circumvent the amendments already noted. For example, 
the enactment in 2006 of section 82 (1AAA) of the Trade Practices Act65 was 
specifically designed to prevent forum shopping between state and federal 
courts.66 One of its results was to prevent claims for death or personal injury 
arising from ‘misleading and deceptive conduct’ in breach of section 52 from 
coming to court. 
 
 
                                                                                                                    
meaning. On the topic of ‘serious injuries’, it has been argued that the courts’ interpretation of 
this expression sets a much higher threshold than is suggested by the relevant legislation: 
Andrew Field, ‘Just How Serious is Section 93: A Re-evaluation of Humphries v. Poljak’ 
(1997) 71(9) Law Institute Journal 34. 
62 See section 68B, inserted by the Trade Practices Amendment (Liability for Recreational 
Services) Act 2002 (Cth), s1.  
63 See section 32N, inserted by the Fair Trading (Amendment) Act 2003 (Vic), s11 and the 
Fair Trading (Further Amendment) Act 2003 (Vic), s24  
64 See Natasha Schot, ‘Negligent Liability in Sport’ (2005) 1 Sports Law eJournal 1. 
65 Inserted by the Trade Practices Amendment (Personal Injuries and Death) Act 2006 (Cth), 
s3 and Sch 1 item 2. 
66 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 9 December 2004, 11 
(Malcolm Brough, Minister for Revenue and Assistant Treasurer). 
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 B Litigation Changes 
 
The effects of these legislative changes were apparent relatively quickly. In 
terms of litigation, the effects can be seen in two ways.  
 
First, there has been the effect on court lists. Although, in anticipation of the 
legislation, there was an initial spike in personal injuries claims brought 
before the courts, the following five years saw a downturn in such litigation. 
Initial trends were identified relatively quickly. For example, in December 
2004, the Law Institute of Victoria was citing County Court statistics which 
indicated that, in the preceding 12 months, the number of personal injury 
writs issued had dropped 88 per cent compared with the previous year.67 Just 
over a year later, the Institute was citing figures indicating that the trend was 
continuing, with public liability law suits dropping by 95 per cent from a 
yearly figure of 1735 before the reforms to a mere 84 in the year 2005.68 The 
position in New South Wales was similar, the Chief Justice himself 
commenting on the ‘dramatic change’ in the practical operation of the law of 
negligence wrought by statute, with personal injuries filings in the District 
Court dropping from 19,000 filings in 2001/2002 to 5,500 in 2004/2005.69 
Undoubtedly these comments give the impression of a collapse in court lists. 
 
More recently, the study by Wright referred to above70 and published in 2006 
presents the trends up to the end of 2005 in a no less dramatic light. As noted, 
Wright culled figures from the statistics of the State District, County and 
Supreme Courts and produced figures indicating both raw numbers of 
claiming rates per ten thousand members of the population. For Victoria, 
Wright’s figures show actions commenced in 2001 as being just over 1200 
(2.69 per 10,000 people), spiking to 2570 (5.30 per 10,000 people) in 2003 in 
anticipation of the legislative changes, and settling at just over 200 claims 
(0.5 per 10,000 people) in 2004 and 2005 in the wake of the changes.71 His 
comment is that the decrease in claims now gives Victoria the distinction of 
being the lowest claiming state in Australia. Reflecting this, Wright’s 
conclusion regarding what occurred in courts across the nation is as follows: 
 
[T]he corrections (if this is the right term) wrought to personal injury 
claiming rates by the reforms in Queensland, New South Wales and Victoria 
                                                 
67 Law Institute of Victoria, ‘Tort Law “Reform” Side Effects Hit Home’ (2004) 78(12) Law 
Institute Journal 21. 
68 Law Institute of Victoria, ‘Tort Stats Spark Call for Review’ (2006) 80(7) Law Institute 
Journal 27. 
69 Chief Justice James Spigelman, ‘Tort Law Reform: An Overview’, (2006) 14 Tort Law 
Review 5. 
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have been dramatic: claims in New South Wales have fallen by over 63%, 
in Queensland by more than 70% and in Victoria by a breath-taking four-
fifths (80%).72 
 
Of course, the injured parties have not vanished into thin air. They have 
simply been deprived of the ability to make a claim against those whose 
negligence caused their loss. 
 
The second effect is also noteworthy, although, as the above figures indicate, 
its impact has been minimal. It has been the creative way in which alternative 
personal injury claims have been brought so as to circumvent the changes. 
For example, in New South Wales and South Australia where the new 
limitations on claiming were essentially limited to negligence claims, the 
intentional torts have proved a possible alternative.73 This alternative has not 
proved so profitable in Victoria because (as noted above74) the Victorian 
legislation was drafted so as to have a broader application. It was stated to 
apply not just to negligence but to ‘any other action’, an expression which 
would appear to include the various intentional torts.75  However, claims have 
been successfully brought which appear not to be subject to the new regime. 
These claims include those either set out under section 28C(2) of the Wrongs 
Act 1958 (Vic) and which are already subject to their own caps (such as 
transport accidents), or those which, through a drafting oversight, have ‘fallen 
through the cracks’.  
 
Although examples of these claims are few and far between, one example is 
the 2007 decision in Hynes v Hynes.76 In this case, the plaintiff brought a 
common law claim for compensation for physical and psychological injuries 
caused by the negligence of the defendant. These injuries were caused when 
the defendant having removed the cap from the overheated radiator of his car, 
boiling water suddenly erupted striking and injuring the plaintiff. On the 
facts, neither cap nor threshold under the Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) applied 
because the relevant provisions of this Act expressly did not apply to the 
                                                                                                                    
70 Wright, above n 27 
71 Ibid 254. 
72 Ibid 266. 
73 See above n 52. See also: Tina Cockburn and Bill Madden, ‘Intentional Torts to the Person, 
Compensation for Injury and the Civil Liability Acts’ (2007) 18 Insurance Law Journal 1, 5-8. 
74 See above n 51. 
75 However, in Esso Australia v Robertson [2005] VSCA 138, it was determined that the Part 
VBA thresholds for claiming non-economic damages do not have such a wide application, as 
the terms of s 28C(3) do not appear in or apply to that part. Thus, a compensation payment 
under s 85B of the Sentencing Act 1991 was allowed without applying the threshold. 
76 [2007] VSCA 7. 
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parts of the Transport Accident Act 1986 (Vic) which related to common law 
claims such as the plaintiff’s. Similarly, although the Transport Accident Act 
imposed its own thresholds and damages limits under section 93, the injury in 
question, not being caused by the ‘driving of a car’, did not fall within that 
section, meaning those thresholds and limits did not apply. The claim did, 
however, fall within section 94 which provided that the Transport Accident 
Commission would indemnify any driver in respect of any liability arising 
out of the ‘use of a motor car’.  
 
However, such cases are the exception. The overwhelming effect on litigation 
has been to see injured persons cease to bring claims. No doubt such persons 
are still present in the community, and their injuries have been caused by the 
negligence of others. However, they have been deprived of their right to 
claim. 
 
 C Insurance Industry Changes 
 
In contrast to injured persons, the insurance industry in Australia is in a much 
stronger position today than was the case in 2002. Undoubtedly the crisis in 
insurance marked a turning point for the industry. From the industry-wide 
losses, worth billions of dollars, that it was experiencing it went into the 
black in 2003. Specifically, according to the figures published by APRA,77 
underwriting results rose from losses to profits of: $1,848 billion in 2003; 
$3,614 billion in 2004; $2,641 billion in 2005; and $3,132 billion in 2006. 
Net profits also re-entered the black in 2003 reaching $5,600 billion in 2006.  
 
In commenting on this trend, the Insurance Council of Australia has said:  
 
The public liability reforms have been very successful. The partnership 
between the insurance industry, the community and government has resulted 
in more available and more affordable public liability premiums for 
consumers.78 
 
Undoubtedly, by preventing a range of lawsuits, legislative changes assisted 
the insurance industry return to profit. However, when it is recalled that the 
urgency of the changes was promoted on account of the increase in the price 
of premiums, the ‘partnership’ appears one-sided. In the year after the 
changes were introduced, reports were still appearing in the media of both 
professional and recreational activities being under threat because of the price 
                                                 
77 Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, above n 6. Once again, the figures were also 
adopted by the insurance industry: Insurance Council of Australia, above n 7.  
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of premiums.79 The general impression to be gained from such reports was 
that the price of premiums had not dropped. 
 
More recently, in a 2005 report commissioned by the Law Council of 
Australia, Richard Cumpston made the same point, querying whether ‘high 
insurer profits allow better benefits to the injured’.80 While noting that 
Australian insurers were arguing that after-tax profits on capital of about 
twelve to fifteen per cent were reasonable, Cumpston observed that, although 
direct insurers obtained returns averaging between eight and eleven per cent 
in the eleven years to June 2004, these returns had jumped to 23 per cent in 
the six months to December 2004.81 Cumpston’s observations regarding third 
party insurers, public liability insurers and medical indemnity insurers also 
revealed returns well above the ‘reasonable’ figures. His conclusion was that 
‘[t]he profits and capital of insurers appear high enough to allow better 
benefits to injured persons, particularly those most harshly affected by recent 
legislative changes.’82 
 
Thus, the appearance is given of an insurance industry which has grown 
strong and profitable on account of legislative changes that have prevented 
plaintiffs initiating claims that previously had drawn on industry funds. 
Further, it is an effect which has been magnified by a failure of the industry 
to decrease its premiums in a meaningful way.  
 
IV A TIME TO EMBRACE THE NO FAULT OPTION? 
 
The preceding discussion indicates that a key effect of the crisis in insurance 
and its consequent developments has been to see the common law diverted 
far away from the interests of the injured and in favour of the interests of 
defendants and private businesses. It is unlikely that this was the intention of 
the legislators, at least in terms of degree. However, it was the result.  
 
                                                                                                                    
78 Insurance Council of Australia, above n 7, 21.  
79 See, for example: Susie O’Brien, ‘New Crisis Hits Events Insurance’, Herald Sun 
(Melbourne), 19 June 2003, 29; Law Society of New South Wales, ‘Will the Sausage Sizzle 
This Christmas’, (Press release, 11 December 2003); Kenneth Davidson, ‘How to Solve the 
Medical Indemnity Crisis’, The Age (Melbourne), 16 October 2003. 
80 Richard Cumpston, ‘High Insurer Profits Allow Better Benefits to the Injured?’, (Paper 
presented at the Personal Injury and Compensation Forum held by the Law Council of 
Australia, Sydney, 3 June 2005) <http://www.lawcouncil.asn.au/tortreform.html> at 22 
November 2007. 
81 Ibid 1. 
82 Ibid. 
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The legislative changes which produced this result do not represent the first 
occasion on which injured plaintiffs have been deprived of their rights to sue 
under the common law. Indeed, the last twenty years have seen this occur in 
most states of Australia at one time or another and in limited circumstances. 
However, when such rights have been abrogated by statute, they have usually 
been replaced with some form of compensation scheme. This has been the 
dominant effect of workers’ compensation schemes and transport accident 
compensation schemes.83 Generally, plaintiffs have not been left standing 
high and dry without some form of claim to compensation. It is in so far as 
they offered no substitute for common law actions that the amendments to the 
Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) and other legislation were significant. 
 
In this context, when the common law is now so skewed, perhaps it is time to 
consider changes to the existing system of compensating the injured. Perhaps 
it is time not merely to tinker around the edges, but rather to consider a 
wholesale replacement of the use of a trial as a means toward compensation. 
After all, if the only way to make the system workable is to deprive the 
innocently injured of access to compensation, then perhaps the system is 
hopelessly flawed and in need of replacement.  
 
Although this suggestion is anathema to most practising common lawyers 
whose livelihood has been built on the existing system, the suggestion is 
neither new nor wholly theoretical. Indeed, it was actually the basis for the 
introduction of the no fault compensation scheme in New Zealand. It was 
also the basis for the introduction of similar limited schemes here in 
Australia. These examples and the reasons for their introduction warrant 
some examination.  
 
 A No Fault Compensation in New Zealand 
 
New Zealand has had a broad-based no fault compensation scheme which has 
largely replaced the common law since 1974.84 Its original manifestation was 
in the Accident Compensation Act 1972. The impetus for the scheme came 
                                                 
83 See for example the Transport Accident Act 1986 (Vic) which although under s93 it 
abolished common law claims for compensation for injuries caused as a result of driving a 
motor car unless the injury constituted a “serious injury”, at the same time under s35 
introduced payments of compensation under a no fault scheme. 
84 As is the case with plaintiffs in Australia seeking to circumvent the reforms of 2002 which 
limited common law claims, in New Zealand plaintiffs have also been creative in their efforts 
to bring claims in those limited situations which fall outside the terms of the no fault scheme. 
See Alisa Duffy, ‘The Common Law Response to the Accident Compensation Scheme’ (2003) 
34 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 367. 
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from the perceived inefficiencies and inequities of the way the common law 
dealt with person injuries claims.  
 
When the 1967 Royal Commission, chaired by Sir Owen Woodhouse, 
investigated these perceived flaws, it found that, although the common law 
delivered benefits to a few, it did so at an extraordinarily high cost.85 
Specifically, administration and other charges absorbed ‘as much as $40 for 
every $60 paid over to successful claimants’.86 This was a significant 
consideration. However, other difficulties inherent in the trial process also 
raised concerns. These included delays and costs, the effects of these matters 
on evidence, and the further compounding effects of navigating the 
vicissitudes of the legal system. And in those cases when these difficulties 
were overcome, the final crowning once and for all time ‘guesstimate’87 of 
damages which was to be made for the successful plaintiff – an estimate 
which must take into account many years of future loss – raised serious 
concerns. They turned the claims system into an imprecise and wasteful 
faultfinding exercise having more in common with a lottery than a scheme 
focused on compensating the injured.88 These concerns have been discussed 
at length many times before,89 and space does not permit a thorough 
discussion of them in this article. For present purposes, the summary by Sir 
Geoffrey Palmer (who was instrumental in the adoption of the scheme) 
usefully sets down the arguments applied in New Zealand: 
 
The arguments were as follows:  
 
                                                 
85 Sir Geoffrey Palmer, ‘“The Nineteen-Seventies”: Summary for Presentation to the Accident 
Compensation Symposium’ (2003) 34 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 239, 240. 
86 Ibid. A similar observation had been made elsewhere. For example, a well known survey 
conducted by Terence Ison found that in England 48.9 per cent of money paid into the legal 
system was spent on its administration: Terence G Inson, The Forensic Lottery (1967), quoted 
in Peter McKenzie, ‘The Compensation Scheme No One Asked For: The Origins of ACC in 
New Zealand” (2003) 34 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 193, 197. 
87 Lim Poh Choo v Camden & Islington Area Health Authority [1980] AC 174, 183 (Lord 
Scarman). 
88 Michael Tilbury, ‘Reconstructing Damages’ (2003) 27 Melbourne University Law Review 
697, 698. See also McKenzie, above n 86; Stephen Todd, ‘Negligence Liability for Personal 
Injury: A Perspective from New Zealand’ (2002) 25 University of New South Wales Law 
Journal 895, 895. 
89 Ibid; see also: Harold Luntz and David Hambly, Torts: Cases and Commentary (5th ed, 
2002) 30-63; Hassan El Menyawi, ‘Public Tort Liability: An Alternative to Tort Liability and 
No-Fault Compensation’ (2002) 9(4) E-Law: Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law 
<http:www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v9n4/menyawi94nf.html> at 6 November 2007. 
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• The failure of the common law to compensate large numbers of 
accident victims;  
• The waste involved in the system in that much of the money was 
chewed up in legal and administrative expenses;  
• The long delays in delivering benefits to those who secured them;  
• That personal blameworthiness was not the real rationale for the 
law because negligence law required individuals to meet the 
community average standard;  
• ‘Reprehensible conduct can be followed by feather blows while a 
moment's inadvertence could call down the heavens’ as the 
Woodhouse Report put it;  
• That liability insurance had blunted or removed the deterrent effect 
of tort law;  
• That an assessment of damages in one lump sum involved 
guesswork and speculation and tended to over-compensate less 
serious injuries;  
• That the process of adjudication was a lottery and impeded the 
rehabilitation of injured people, and there were strong incentives to 
maximise misery; and 
• Accident prevention was impeded by the system.90  
 
The arguments against common law personal injury compensation carried the 
day. They led to the adoption of the no fault scheme.  
 
Today the scheme is administered by the Accident Compensation 
Corporation (‘ACC’) under the Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation and 
Compensation Act 2001 (NZ). It draws its funding from a number of different 
sources including employers, income earners, the Government (which makes 
up the share for non-income earners), and tariffs on petrol and motor vehicle 
registrations.91 It is characterised by periodic claims payments which are paid 
in weeks and months after the accident rather than years. Also, although it 
applies to most injuries, it does not purport to cover the field. For example, it 
does not apply to most mental injuries.92 However, the legislation did not 
abolish those common law causes of action that were not covered and so the 
                                                 
90 Palmer, above n 85, 240-1 (citation omitted). 
91Accident Compensation Corporation, How ACC is Funded <http://www.acc.co.nz/about-
acc/WCM000119> at 22 November 2007. 
92 Although sections 20(4) and 22(6) of the Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation and 
Compensation Act 2001 (NZ) provide coverage for ‘personal injury’, section 26 in defining 
this term only includes mental injuries caused by physical injuries, or those mental injuries 
falling within the coverage of section 21 (i.e. mental injuries caused by criminal acts). 
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option of pursuing them still remains.93 A plaintiff with such a claim is not 
left without a remedy.94 
 
There are critics of the system,95 and clearly it is not perfect. Otherwise its 
governing legislation would not be regularly amended.96 Criticisms range 
from the expense of the scheme,97 to the payments it makes to the injured 
being too low,98 to the notion that the ‘collectivist vision of community 
responsibility’ represents an attack on the individual.99 The removal of 
faultfinding and its consequent deterrent effect has also been speculated 
upon100 – although, as indicated above, the common law has always been a 
blunt and imprecise tool for this function, and is relatively feeble compared to 
its counterpart in the United States.101 Deterrence is perhaps a matter best 
dealt with by suitably empowered professional regulators and, in the most 
severe cases, by the criminal law. A further criticism is that the scheme has 
                                                 
93 Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 2001 (NZ) s 83. 
94 See, for example, the judgment in Queenstown Lakes District Council v Palmer [1999] 1 
NZLR 549. 
95 The most vocal in recent years has been the New Zealand Business Roundtable which has 
sought a return to private insurance and consumer choice in insurance coverage: Bryce 
Wilkinson, ‘The Accident Compensation Scheme: A Case Study in Public Policy’ (2003) 34 
Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 313. See also Todd, above n 88, 901. 
96 In addition to minor amendments as may be made to any legislation from time to time, Sir 
Geoffrey Palmer notes four main versions of the relevant legislation, as follows: Accident 
Compensation Act 1972 (NZ); Accident Compensation Act 1982 (NZ); Accident, 
Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance Act 1992 (NZ); and Injury Prevention, 
Rehabilitation, and Compensation Act 2001 (Vic); Palmer above n 85, 239-240. 
97 This was a recent concern raised when such a scheme was mooted for Australia. See the 
discussion in the text below. 
98 This result has been one of the consequences of the amendments of the governing legislation 
during the last three decades: Duffy above n 84, 368.  
99 Wilkinson, above n 95, 325. 
100 Duffy, above n 84, 383.  
101 In the United States, the use of exemplary or ‘punitive’ damages has seen payments ordered 
in terms of hundreds of millions of dollars. For example, in Grimshaw v Ford Motor Company 
119 Cal App 3d 757 (1981), the Californian Court of Appeal awarded punitive damages of 
USD125 million against the Ford Motor Company on account of its negligent manufacture and 
supply of a mass produced motor vehicle which resulted in the death of one plaintiff and 
serious injury to another. In that case, it was specifically stated that this power to award such 
damages (which was codified in statute) was specifically intended to provide punishment in 
cases where government regulation was inadequate. In contrast, in New Zealand such 
payments are not awarded under the no fault scheme, and in Australia, in those common law 
jurisdiction where such damages have not been abolished, they are rarely awarded. Regarding 
the argument that compensatory damages as presently awarded might be viewed as a 
‘punishment’, it has been argued that the realisation of such a concept would be incoherent and 
would impede the progressive development of the law: Tilbury above n 88, 697. The relevant 
point is that deterrence has rarely been a guiding principle in the awarding of damages in most 
common law jurisdictions.    
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led to an avalanche of claims. However, recent research into medical injuries 
has established that most people with the basis for a claim do not pursue such 
compensation.102  
 
In summary, today the New Zealand scheme is broadly accepted. It has 
survived changes of government, and revisions to its legislation, but is still a 
scheme characterised by its swift compensation of the injured despite its 
bureaucratic administration. It is a scheme that is frequently described by its 
supporters as a success.103 
 
 B The Local Experience of ‘No Fault’ Schemes 
 
Australia has had a few experiences of no fault insurance schemes. That 
which has most in common with the New Zealand scheme was the broad-
based scheme proposed in the 1970s when the Labor Government 
commissioned a report into the matter, that inquiry also chaired by Owen 
Woodhouse. The scheme that Woodhouse proposed was broadly similar to 
that in New Zealand, although in certain respects it was more expansive. For 
example, it extended to all injuries rather than merely those caused by 
accidents, as was the case in New Zealand.104 However, this scheme was 
never adopted. In many respects this should not be too surprising. First, it 
threatened some substantial interests in the community who fought it 
strongly. In an article on the subject, Harold Luntz identifies three significant 
interest groups that felt threatened by the scheme.105 The first group was the 
legal profession, whose members were threatened with losing part of their 
livelihood. In this group the Prime Minister of the day, Gough Whitlam, 
included labour lawyers, usually a group with plaintiffs’ best interests in 
mind, but who in this case were arguably as threatened as defence lawyers.106  
 
The second group was made up of the official organisations of the medical 
profession, which were captured (Luntz suggests) by those of the 
profession’s members who either made a lucrative income from providing 
medico-legal reports for trials, or who charged higher fees to patients injured 
                                                 
102 The study compared review data from the New Zealand Quality of Healthcare Study, which 
identified ‘compensable claims’ with a national dataset of actual compensation claims, and 
found just under 3 per cent of eligible persons actually claimed. See Marie M Bismark et al, 
‘Claiming Behaviour in a No-Fault System of Medical Injury: A Descriptive Analysis of 
Claimants and Con-claimants’ (2006) 185(4) Medical Journal of Australia 203.  
103 See Todd, above n 88, 896, 901; Luntz, above n 24, 841.  
104 Harold Luntz, ‘Looking Back at Accident Compensation: An Australian Perspective’ 
(2003) 34 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 279, 284. 
105 Ibid 286-287. 
106 Gough Whitlam, The Whitlam Government 1972-1975 (1985) 640.  
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in circumstances where compensation was available.107 Apparently, few of 
these doctors saw that they were sitting on the edge of an age when doctors 
themselves would become significant targets of negligence claims which 
would send their own insurance premiums spiralling – something which a no 
fault scheme would have avoided.  
 
Finally, the third group was the insurance industry. Its members would be 
deprived not only of significant cash flows but also of access to clients who 
would take out insurance in more profitable areas. In the 1970s, the insurers 
were also fighting government proposals to create a government insurer 
which would compete against them. Thus, as Luntz explains, ‘[t]heir 
opposition was fierce, and extended to encouraging their employees to march 
against an alleged threat to their jobs.’108 
 
Combined with these opponents were a number of other factors that 
weakened the cause of the scheme. These included a lack of support from 
‘natural allies’, or support that was qualified or muted.109 For example, some 
trade unions were concerned that their members would be sacrificing rights to 
100 per cent of their pre-accident earnings, which existed under some of the 
state workers’ compensation schemes, for the 85 per cent of pre-accident 
earnings which was being proposed under the no fault scheme. In addition, 
general coverage and public discussion of the proposal were muted because 
the Australian Woodhouse Report was but one of a plethora of reports 
commissioned by the Government at the time; it was effectively one of many 
gasping for oxygen and which was in short supply. Finally, it must be said 
that even a government that has broad-based support would probably have a 
difficult time introducing such a scheme. In 1975, when the legislation was 
being debated, the scandal-ridden Labor Government at that time was hardly 
in a good position to implement the scheme.   
 
And yet, despite this environment, when the relevant legislation was 
considered, a unanimous Senate Committee made up of three government 
and three opposition members found good cause to consider a new system: 
 
It is clear that the compensation systems are random in their coverage, often 
provide inadequate compensation and can give rise to inequities. The 
committee is concerned that existing social service benefits for sickness are 
inadequate and that compensation for injuries is effectively limited to work-
caused injuries suffered by employees, to some victims of criminal acts and 
                                                 
107 Luntz, above n 104, 287. 
108 Ibid 288. 
109 Ibid 285-6. 
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to those victims of highway accidents who can establish fault in other 
persons and are not disqualified by want of care on their part.110 
 
Warming to its theme, the Committee appears to have then foretold what 
ultimately occurred in 2002 when it said: 
 
The committee believes that unless significant changes are made to existing 
remedies for injury, most of which are financed by insurance, their cost will 
become too high to be financed by insurance premiums and governments 
will be required to provide supplementary financial assistance. It seems 
logical to the committee that, if governments are to be required to give 
financial assistance in this area, it is an appropriate time to consider new 
approaches to the provision of more equitable and comprehensive coverage 
at the lowest possible cost…111 
 
The only fault which can be found with this prophesy was that the Committee 
assumed that, somehow, a way would always be found to look after the 
injured, if not through insurance then through government support. The 
prospect that plaintiffs would be left totally without means does not appear to 
have been even contemplated by the Committee as a viable option of social 
policy. However, seeing problems with the proposed legislation, the 
Committee required a redraft and the legislation ultimately died with a 
subsequent change of government and the rallying of those forces opposed to 
it.112  
 
Despite this experience, the introduction of no fault schemes has found 
favour in various Australian state jurisdictions in the form of limited schemes 
in areas such as workers’ compensation and transport accidents. And yet even 
the acceptance of these schemes, which only apply in limited situations, has 
clearly been compromised by political interests and the pressuring of lobby 
groups. The example of Victoria’s Transport Accident Act 1986 is illustrative 
of this. Introduced during the 1980s by the Labor Government of John Cain, 
it was conceived as a no fault scheme which would cover the field, 
abrogating the common law for all claims arising from injuries caused as a 
result of a transport accident.113 However, opposition in the Parliament’s 
                                                 
110 Senate Standing Committee on Constitutional and Legal Affairs, Parliament of Australia, 
Report on the Clauses of the National Compensation Bill (1975) [1.21].  
111 Ibid [1.22]. 
112 Apparently the Bill was redrafted and was ready to be introduced in November 1975 just as 
the Labour Government was dismissed and Parliament dissolved. A subsequent lack of support 
saw that it was never voted on in the new Parliament: Luntz, above n 104, 289. 
113 Defined to mean ‘an incident directly caused by the driving of a motor car or motor vehicle, 
a railway train or a tram’: Transport Accident Act 1986 (Vic) s 3. 
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upper house meant that the scheme was compromised,114 the result being that, 
under section 93, the option still remained of bringing a common law claim if 
the accident was classified as ‘serious’.115 Thus, the scheme introduced was a 
hybrid. And yet, in an ironic twist, a decade later the Liberal Government of 
Jeff Kennett adopted the original plan it had earlier opposed when in 
opposition, and repealed the right to pursue common law claims. Thus, in 
showing the opportunism which has characterised government actions in 
relation to this topic, it was then the Labor Opposition which abandoned its 
old position and, having been encouraged by plaintiff lawyers, promised to 
restore these limited common law claims. It did this in 2000 after assuming 
power.116  Such is the fate of no fault compensation schemes in Australia.  
 
 C The 2002 Concerns and Beyond 
 
The possibility of a no fault scheme was also raised briefly during the crisis 
in insurance. Early in 2002 as the crisis gained momentum, the Minister for 
Small Business, Joe Hockey, spoke out, blaming the cost of insurance on the 
legal profession, and labelling the courts as ‘out of control’. His solution was 
to abolish common law personal injury claims and introduce a New Zealand 
style no fault scheme.117 The swiftness and vehemence of the response to his 
solution gave a clear indication once again of the forces opposed to such an 
idea. Within a day of Hockey’s comments being reported, responses 
criticising the no fault scheme were forthcoming from the Law Council of 
Australia,118 the Australian Plaintiff Lawyers Association,119 and the 
Insurance Council of Australia.120 However, the strongest criticism was that 
which came from Senator Helen Coonan who, as the Minister for Revenue 
and Assistant Treasurer, was Hockey’s senior in the Government.  Coonan’s 
often repeated (but briefly stated) concern with a New Zealand-type system 
was the issue of unfunded liabilities that were being experienced with that 
                                                 
114 See Luntz, above n 104, 291. 
115 For a discussion on the meaning of this term, see Mobilio v Bolliotis [1998] VR 833. See 
also Field, above n 61. 
116 Minister for Workcover, ‘Going Forward: Government Delivers On Common Law Rights 
For Seriously Injured Workers’ (Press Release, 11 April 2000) <http://www.dpc.vic.gov.au/ 
domino/Web_Notes/MediaRelArc02.nsf> at 7 December 2007.  
117 Toni O’Loughlin and Cynthia Banham, ‘Insurance Crisis Leaves Ministers at Odds’, 
Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 22 January 2002, 4. 
118 Ibid. 
119 Duncan Macfarlane, ‘Litigation “Feeding Frenzy”’, The Australian (Sydney), 22 January 
2002, 6.  
120 Sharon Kemp and Annabel Crabbe with Gabrielle Costa, ‘Compensation Scheme Comes 
Under Fire’, The Age (Melbourne), 22 January 2002, 4. 
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system.121 To be specific, for a population of 3 million people, the unfunded 
liability of New Zealand’s Accident Compensation Corporation in 2002 was 
large, and by 2007 amounted to around NZD14 billion (or AUD 12 
billion).122  
 
The figure sounds staggering and its apparent magnitude sees it regularly 
deployed whenever a no fault scheme is suggested. Indeed, it is a favourite 
device used by critics of the system, and is usually mentioned without either 
explanation or comparison. Its use without discussion has led Professor 
Harold Luntz to describe it as ‘scare tactics’.123 Thus, explaining what is 
meant by the expression ‘unfunded liability’ in contrast to ‘fully funded 
liability’ in the present context can go some way towards de-sensationalising 
the facts. The situation was well explained by Andrew Stritch back in the 
1990s, when a return to private insurance was mooted in New Zealand: 
 
Full funding means that the revenue collected in premiums in any one year 
should cover the total, long-term, costs of the claims occurring in that year. 
The total costs of a claim can be substantial because people who are 
permanently disabled in Year 1 will also receive compensation in Years 2, 
3, 4, etc. This may be as much as 40 years worth of payments. To cover all 
these future payments from revenues collected in Year 1 means that 
employers, workers and motorists must pay a hefty premium…124  
 
In its accounts, New Zealand’s ACC includes these future liabilities, even 
though a significant portion may never be realised. For example, recipients of 
payments may die earlier than anticipated by the ACC, even though provision 
might have been made in the ACC accounts for many more years of 
payments. Other recipients may be sufficiently rehabilitated such that they no 
longer require payments. However, it is by including them that the deficit is 
created. And yet, 
 
full funding is unnecessary because there will also be income in future years 
which can be applied to these future expenses as they arise. As long as your 
                                                 
121 Toni O’Loughlin, ‘NZ Way Has its Problems’, The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 26 
January 2002, 23; Coonan, above n 5; Coonan, above n 20, 823. 
122 Accident Compensation Corporation, Annual Report 2007 (2007) 128 
<http://www.acc.co.nz/PRD_EXT_CSMP/groups/external_communications/documents/intern
et/dis_ctrb097219.pdf> at 11 April 2008.  
123 Luntz, above n 24, 841. 
124 Andrew Stritch, ‘Competition and Compensation: The Privatisation of the ACC’ (1998) 11 
Social Policy Journal of New Zealand 1, 3 <http://www.msd.govt.nz/publications/journal/11-
december-1998/index.html#4> at 7 December 2007. 
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current year's income covers your current year's expenses, your accounts 
will be happily in balance, and you may even have a surplus for savings.125 
 
Stritch then goes on to explain that families, corporations, public institutions 
and government agencies all operate quite successfully on this pay as you go 
basis. In this way, the ‘unfunded liability’ should not appear so ominous.126 
Indeed, viewed this way, the no fault scheme in New Zealand appears very 
similar to a social security scheme (on which it might be observed 
uncompensated injured persons would otherwise have to rely).  
 
Add to this understanding the fact that in cases in Australia where the 
common law either provides no compensation or the lump sum awarded is 
found years later to be inadequate, and the fallacy of the comparison between 
the common law in Australia and the ‘unfunded no fault scheme’ in New 
Zealand is exposed. It is not the case that the former provides cover for all. 
The fact is that the common law is no longer so expansive. Also, it is not the 
case that the latter is a precarious bureaucratic structure always on the verge 
of collapse. The fact is that the ACC is a far healthier beast than its detractors 
would have the world believe.  
 
Having made these points, it is worth reflecting that the arguments proposed 
in New Zealand in support of the no fault scheme over the common law have 
not diminished and are just as applicable in Australia. Indeed, in the years 
since the crisis in insurance, those arguments have been magnified. In 
contrast to New Zealand’s no fault scheme that did not abolish claims that 
did not fall within its terms, much of the then new Australian legislation had 
precisely this characteristic. In addition, despite the abrogation of such 
claims, the delays in litigation have remained. Indeed, as recently as 
December 2007, Victoria’s Chief Justice Marilyn Warren was reported as 
                                                 
125 Ibid 3-4. 
126 Even so, in defence of the ACC some statement should be made against the allegation that 
it will always be funded in this way. Specifically, in its 2007 Annual Report, the ACC 
addressed this issue by way of explaining why it had generated an operating surplus for the 
year: the surplus was intended to generate investment capital so as to eventually achieve ‘fully 
funded’ status. In addition, the ACC was able to say that its reserves portfolios had grown 16 
per cent in the preceding year, to NZD 9.2 billion at 30 June 2007: Accident Compensation 
Corporation, , above n 122, 47. This is an existing sum greater than half of the unrealised 
‘unfunded’ liability of NZD 14 billion noted above.  
However, even if full funding were required for such a scheme should it be adopted in 
Australia, when it is recalled that in late 2007 Australians witnessed an election campaign in 
which both sides of politics offered over $30 billion in tax cuts, there is a clear suggestion that 
the coffers of the Commonwealth Government are over full. See Brendan Nicholson, ‘Tax 
Cuts of $34 billion’, The Age (Melbourne), 15 October 2007. 
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seeking more judges and more space for trials, the volume of cases before the 
Supreme Court having bottlenecked the system.127 On the same day, another 
senior judge, Justice David Byrne, was reported as wanting barristers to ‘pare 
down their point scoring and abandon all but the most contentious issues 
before a case gets to trial’.128 These views appear to echo similar comments 
made by former High Court Justice Ian Callinan a month earlier when he 
pointed to problems with the adversarial system being too long and costing 
too much.129 Thus, perhaps it is from the High Court that a final example 
should be drawn of how the common law can be a black hole of inefficiency. 
Specifically, when it is recalled that in 2005 the High Court heard four cases 
all involving diving accidents in which plaintiffs suffered spinal injuries, 
cases in which judges at all levels differed in their opinions,130 a level of 
waste and uncertainty in the fault-finding exercise is difficult to not to 
perceive. This impression is derived even when not taking into account the 
diving cases that did not reach the High Court. It poses the question: how 
much of this expense could have been better spent compensating the injured? 
 
V CONCLUSION 
 
Should Australia introduce a no fault injuries compensation scheme? 
 
It sounds like an anathema to make such a suggestion; a return to welfare 
state thinking, the 1940s, and schemes that crippled national economies 
through the 1950s and 1960s. And yet the reasoning behind adopting such a 
scheme is not about social restructuring, or creating a soft-hearted ‘caring 
society’. It is ultimately about dollars and cents – the most efficient use of 
those dollars and cents – and also about fairness. 
 
Of course, this question feeds directly into the broader philosophical debate 
which places the fault concept underlying tort law, and its associated notions 
of individual responsibility, against the concept of loss spreading whereby 
the community shares in compensating for the injuries suffered by its 
members, regardless of a finding of fault. That argument has been restated 
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many times,131 but any clarity that might have once existed in its practical 
application is at best hypothetical in twenty-first century Australia. Tort law 
as applied by the courts involves identifying the individual responsibility of a 
tortfeasor for his or her wrongs and requiring that tortfeasor to make good the 
damage caused by those wrongs. However, inherent in the ‘crisis in 
insurance’ was the fact that most tortfeasors were not ultimately subjected to 
the full weight of such findings, or the associated deterrent effect, because 
their actions were underwritten by their insurers. In other words, loss 
spreading was already occurring, albeit to an extent limited by the number of 
other policy-holders insured by the common insurer.  If it remains the 
accepted assumption that the community should provide some method of 
compensating injured people in certain cases,132 then the move towards a no 
fault scheme would simply be extending this trend, while at the same time 
removing the costly incidents of litigation and private indemnification. 
 
The no fault scheme which Australia first considered was not a post-war 
reward for victory over the invader, which is an often repeated reason for 
Britain’s post-war welfare revolution. Rather, what Australia considered 
adopting in the 1970s was a new approach to the dilemma of inefficient and 
expensive methods of providing for the injured. That a Senate Committee 
composed equally of Government and Opposition senators advocated such a 
scheme (albeit with some tinkering), speaks volumes about the attractiveness 
of the scheme. As the bi-partisan approach indicates, this was not an issue of 
political philosophy. It was a pragmatic issue of dollars and cents.  
 
That such a scheme was not adopted can be attributed to a number of factors. 
Well and loudly spoken vested interests against were one factor frequently 
cited. When combined with higher time-consuming political priorities, they 
helped spell the death knell of the scheme. However, possibly the most 
significant argument was that the common law at that time still functioned in 
a largely unfettered way. There were no injury thresholds to be cleared before 
                                                 
131 See, for example: Luntz and Hambly, above n 89, ch 1; John G Fleming, The Law of Torts 
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you could sue and no limits on damages if the damage established was great. 
The arguments in favour of the common law quite easily held sway, and it is 
understandable why this was so. Although not perfect, it is often said that the 
hallmark of the common law is fairness. 
 
However, times and the law have changed. The analogy with a card game is 
apt. In the 1970s, and for a long time after, the plaintiff claiming for personal 
injury still had some winning hands to play. It was a fairer contest. However, 
after the 2002 crisis in insurance and the legislative changes introduced, 
plaintiffs saw the aces removed from their hands. The defendants and their 
insurers were given a loaded deck and the ability to fight a claim knowing 
that the most extreme damages claims were capped (along with the dangers 
of contesting them). These people were also strengthened in the knowledge 
that most pain and suffering claims were now denied. In practical terms, the 
denial of such multiplicitous claims helped increase their bottom line.  
 
In plain terms, the rights of plaintiffs were taken away to assist financially 
challenged private businesses. What was already a hybrid common law 
system – on account of the limited no fault compensation schemes for some 
injuries – was emasculated. The strengths of the common law were removed. 
Almost immediately after the changes were first introduced, and for each of 
the five years thereafter, the insurance firms which lobbied so hard for the 
changes have been returning profits which are counted in the billions of 
dollars. In contrast, many plaintiffs are the poorer, and their pain and 
suffering is often set at nought. Their defender – the common law – is but a 
pale imitation of its former self. Meanwhile, the negligent defendants who 
caused that pain and suffering are largely untouched. Where is the deterrence 
in that?  
 
So this is the question: when viewing the present complex and restrictive 
state of the common law, should we now be considering alternatives? 
Whether the best alternative is merely a winding back of the legislation of 
2002 and 2003, or a wholesale return to the common law, or as a further 
alternative the adoption of a no fault compensation scheme, is a moot 
question. Although flaws with the common law have been noted, a wind-
back is possible. The common law has its defenders. This is understandable. 
Many defence lawyers extol its virtues as a separator of the meritorious 
claims from the frivolous cases.133 Further, to give it due credit, it has served 
many a plaintiff well.  
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In contrast, if the no fault option was pursued, although it could cut through 
many of the problems of the adversarial system, it could also produce an 
ironic twist. Specifically, there is more than a possibility that the same 
insurers who decried the excesses of the common law could become its 
greatest defenders, the threat of being banished from the system and extra 
premiums arguably being too much for the industry to bear. Such a threat 
could possibly also turn them into advocates of a wind-back of some of the 
amendments of 2002 and 2003. 
 
And yet, whichever option is ultimately adopted, there is at least one 
certainty. It is apparent when the present system is observed. It is certain that 
that there must be a better way.  
 
                                                                                                                    
this article, it was suggested to the author viva voce that many conscientious defence lawyers 
can claim they have ‘never lost a case’ because they settle those which present meritorious 
claims, and only contest at trial those claims where the defendant’s negligence cannot be 
proved. And yet while such a claim is clearly good evidence of the finely tuned skills of these 
trial lawyers, what it fails to address is that plaintiffs with meritorious claims might have good 
reasons for settling claims for lesser sums of compensation than may be warranted by an 
injury, and that the reasons for settling for lesser sums may be more pragmatic. They might be 
based in many matters, including: concerns about the time it takes to get to trial; the stress 
involved in going to trial (which may be exacerbated in the case of injured persons); the 
concerns with how well witnesses may present as the interval between accident and trial grows 
(meaning that the ‘testing’ of the evidence is not actually a testing of the ‘best’ and freshest 
evidence); and the realisation that sometimes the unexpected can occur during trials. In 
addition, while some of these matters might be resolved on appeal, this time interval can 
exacerbate the ‘justice delayed’. In summary, rather than being a complete argument in favour 
of the strengths of the common law for both defendant and plaintiff, this argument neglects the 
fact that the best settlement for a negligent defendant is not necessarily the best settlement for 
an innocent plaintiff who may have legitimate concerns about going to trial which are 
unconnected with the merits of his or her case. 
